Brady Bill And Its Passage Essay Research

Brady Bill And Its Passage Essay, Research Paper Brady measure and its passageIntroductionThe legislative procedure in the United States Congress shows us an interesting play inwhich a measure becomes a jurisprudence through via medias made by diverse and sometimes conflictinginterests in this state. There have been many controversial measures passed by Congress, butamong all, I have taken a peculiar involvement in the transition of the Brady measure. When the Bradydebate was in full swing in Congress about three old ages ago, I was still back in my state, Japan, where the ownership of guns is purely restricted by Torahs. While watching televisionnews studies on the Brady argument, I wondered what was doing it so hard for this gun controlbill to go through in this gun force ridden state. In this paper, I will follow the measure # 8217 ; s seven yearhistory in Congress, which I hope will uncover how partizan political relations played a important function in theBrady measure # 8217 ; s transition in this policy doing subdivision. The Brady measure took its name from Jim Brady, the former imperativeness secretary of PresidentReagan, who was shot in the caput and partly paralyzed in the blackwash effort on thepresident in 1981. This measure was about a waiting period on pistol purchases leting constabulary tocheck the backgrounds of the prospective purchasers to do certain that guns are non sold toconvicted criminals or to those who are mentally unstable. Even the advocates of the measure agreedthat the consequence of the measure on controling the gun force might be minimum sing the fact that themajority of guns used for condemnable intents were purchased through illegal traders. However, the Brady Bill represented the first major gun control statute law passed by Congress for morethan 20 old ages, and it meant a important triumph for gun control advocates in their manner towardeven stricter gun control statute law in the hereafter. Gun Rights V. Gun ControlThe Brady measure, the Brady Handgun Violence Preventi on Act, was foremost introduced byEdward F. Feighan ( D-OH ) in the House of the100th Congress as HR975 on February 4,1987. The measure was referred to the Judiciary Committee, and the argument began. Throughout thedebate on the Brady measure, there was ever a clear partizan split ; most of the Democrats, exceptfor those from the Southern provinces, supported the measure while most of the Republicans were in theopposition. For illustration, when the foremost introduced Brady measure lost to an amendment by BillMcCollum ( R-FL ) for a survey of an instant cheque system ( 228-182 ) , most Republicans votedfor the McCollum amendment ( 127 for and 45 against ) while the bulk of the Democratsvoted against it ( 127 for and 137 against ) . The exclusion was the Southern Democrats most ofwhom joined the Republicans to vote for the amendment. This party division was non sosurprising, nevertheless, sing the immense run parts made by the main gun anteroom, the National Rifle Association ( NRA ) , directed largely to the Republicans, and the exclusion ofthe Southern Democrats could be explained by the gun right supportive nature of theirconstituents. In the 1992 election for illustration, this organisation made $ 1.7 million contributionto its sympathetic congressional campaigners and spent another $ 870,000 in independentexpenditures for congressional races.1 The influence the NRA exercised on the statute law wasenormous since the concluding measure passed in 1993 was a via media version reflecting some of theNRA-sought commissariats. I could state that it was because of this relentless anteroom that the Bradybill took every bit long as 7 old ages to go a law.On the other side, the advocators of the measure enjoyed a broad support from the populace aswell as from the Handgun Control Inc. , the main gun control anteroom led by Sarah Brady, the wifeof James Brady. The consistent public support for the measure from the debut through thepassage of the measure was manifested by many polls. One of the polls conducted by NBC Newsand Wall Street Journal on the passage of the measure said that 74 per centum of the 1,002respondents agreed that # 8220 ; the jurisprudence is good but more is needed. # 8221 ; 2 It is without inquiry that thispublic support played a important function in the eventual transition of the bill.The Brady measure passed the House in the 102nd CongressAfter about four old ages from its first debut to the Congress, the Brady measure wasreintroduced to the House in the 102nd Congress as HR 7 on January 3, 1991, sponsored by76 representatives including Feighan, William J Hughes ( D-NJ ) , and Charles Schumer ( D-NY ) .The measure was referred to the Judiciary Committee, and the hearings began in the JudiciarySubcommittee on Crime on March 21, 1991. As written, this measure required a weeklong waitingperiod on the pistol purchases. Schumer, the president every bit good as the head patron of the measure, explained before the Subcommittee that the Brady measure # 8220 ; has a really simple intent: to maintain lethalhandguns out of the custodies of people who shouldn # 8217 ; Ts have them.3 # 8243 ; Aside from the house supportfrom the populace, the measure besides gained the backup from the former president Reagan who, in atribute to James Brady, said that it is # 8220 ; merely kick common sense that there be a waiting period toallow local jurisprudence enforcement functionaries to carry on background cheques on those who wish to purchase ahandgun. # 8221 ; 4 This Reagan # 8217 ; s comment was important since he had long been a member of theNRA. On April 10, the Subcommittee approved to direct the measure to the Judiciary Committee bythe ballot of 9-4. The ballots were clearly divided along the party line with the exclusive exclusion ofF. James Sensenbrenner Jr. ( R-WI ) , one of the few GOP protagonists of the measure, who joined theDemocrats to vote for it. In the interim, the lobbying by both sides had inten sified. The NRAclaimed that the measure went against the rule of the Constitution, indicating out the SecondAmendment which says: # 8220 ; A good regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to maintain and bear Weaponries, shall non be infringed. # 8221 ; They argued that it wasnot the guns but the people who committed offenses, stating that tougher sentences for thecriminals would work better than the waiting period in cut downing offenses. On the other manus, James Brady was buttonholing intensely in his wheelchair supported by his-wife-led HandgunControl Inc. , which had an emotional entreaty to other members of Congress.In the Judiciary Committee, Harley O. Staggers Jr. ( D-WV ) , pushed by the NRA, proposed a replacement measure ( HR 1412 ) which would necessitate provinces to put up an instant checksystem so that gun traders could happen out instantly on a telephone call whether the purchaserhad a condemnable record without any delay. The Staggers # 8217 ; alternate, nevertheless, reminded many ofthe McCollum amendment that wrecked the Brady measure in 1988. With the recognition ofthe Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh, that the practical usage of such instant cheque systemwould be old ages away,5 the Staggers # 8217 ; replacement was rejected by the Committee by the ballot of11-23. The commission so proceeded to vote on the Brady measure ( HR 7 ) , O.K.ing it by the 23-11 ballot. On May 8, the Staggers # 8217 ; amendment was rejected once more ( 193-234 ) on the floor. TheHouse went on to O.K. the weeklong waiting period Brady measure by the ballot of 239-186, puting it on the Senate calendar on June 3. Argument in the SenateIn the Senate, the advocates of the Brady measure, including the Majority Leader George J. Mitchell ( D-ME ) , were working hard to maintain the Brady linguistic communication portion of the omnibus crimelegislation ( S-1241 ) which had already been passed by the House-Senate confe rencecommittee. Ted Stevens ( R-AK ) proposed an amendment to replace the waiting period with aninstant-check system. This amendment was really much similar to the Staggers # 8217 ; proposal made inthe House, guaranting that the possible purchasers who were eligible for the purchase would non haveto delay to purchase a gun. Stevens and other GOP oppositions argued that the waiting period wouldnot cut down the offense rate since it would non impact the bulk of felons who could purchaseguns illicitly while impacting the observant citizens # 8217 ; Second Amendment right to buy a gunfor athleticss and runing intents. In response to this statement, Mitchell and his other pro-BradyDemocrats maintained that developing a package for a national blink of an eye background checksystem would take old ages, and even if it was available, instant cheques would non work every bit adeterrent to hot-blooded offenses by those without condemnable records. Mitchell called the Stevens # 8217 ; progra m # 8220 ; a transparent attempt to extinguish the waiting period, # 8221 ; 6 stating that it was merely a pretense tothe populace to back gun command while really barricading it. On June 28, the Senate rejected the Stevens # 8217 ; amendment by the ballot of 44-54 with allbut nine Democrats, all from Southern or rural provinces, voting against it. The 54 ballots, nevertheless, were non plenty for the Brady advocators since they would necessitate 6 more ballots to halt a possibleGOP filibuster. On the other manus, filibustering was non the best solution for the GOPopponents neither, since in making so, they would hold to give the offense measure they wanted. Resulting from this state of affairs was a via media by Mitchell, Metzenbaum, and the GOPleader Bob Dole ( R-KS ) . In this via media, the length of the waiting period was changedfrom seven yearss to five concern yearss, and a new proviso was added which would stop thewaiting period in two and a half old ages upon the Attorne y General # 8217 ; s verification that the instantcheck system met certain criterions. However, it was the six ballots that determined the fateof the Brady measure in the 102nd Congress. The Senate failed to take concluding action before the terminal ofthe 1991 congressional session, and even with the transition in the House, the Brady measure still hadto wait two more old ages for its concluding transition. In the 103rd Congress ( House ) In 1993, the twelvemonth in which the Brady measure got enacted, there was a turning national tidefavoring stricter gun control. The Brady advocates were cheerful with an outlook that thelong-debated measure would eventually go through that twelvemonth. The rush in the public support was assuring ; aCNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted during March 12 through 14 showed that 88 percentof their 1,007 respondents favored the bill.7 The gun control advocates besides had two significantvictories in two States ; in Virginia, a statute law was passed cur tailing pistol purchases to onegun purchase per month, and in New Jersey, the NRA and other gun rights advocates lost intheir attempt to revoke the province # 8217 ; s prohibition on selling assault rifles. Furthermore, the 103rd Congresshad a pro-Brady president. In contrast to Bush, a longtime NRA member, President Clintonopenly expressed his support for the measure ; in his address to Congress on February 17, he said: # 8220 ; Ifyou pass the Brady measure, I # 8217 ; ll certain mark it. # 8221 ; Confronting this countrywide pro-Brady tide, Even the NRAshowed a little alteration in its linguistic communication ; James Jay Baker, the top NRA lobbyist, said that hisorganization might be able to O.K. certain version of the bill.8 In this favourable ambiance, the Brady measure was introduced in the103rd Congress in theHouse as HR 1025 on February 22, 1993 by Schumer and 98 other cosponsors, referred to theJudiciary Committee. The president of the Committee, Jack Brooks ( D-TX ) ag reed to maintain thebill separate from his other overall offense statute law ( HR 3131 ) , promoting the Bradysupporters with a hope to go through the measure before the scheduled Thanksgiving dissolution. By thedirection of the Rules Committee, the House voted on the House Resolution 302, a ruleproviding for the floor consideration of the Brady measure, O.K.ing it by the ballot of 238-182. Aswritten, the measure provided for a five-day waiting period upon pistol purchases every bit good as theestablishment of a national instant felon background cheque system. The measure besides had aprovision necessitating that the waiting period stage out upon the Attorney General # 8217 ; s blessing of theviability of the countrywide instant cheque. The measure by so already represented a compromisebetween the Brady waiting period and the NRA blink of an eye check.On the floor, the GOP oppositions proposed a series of amendments. George W. Gekas ( R-PA ) offered an amendment stoping the waiting period after five old ages from its enforcementregardless of the viability of the replacement instant cheque system. Schumer argued that the Gekas # 8217 ; alleged sundown proviso was an unrealistic deadline, indicating out the changing condemnable recordkeeping of each States. However, Gekas and other advocates of the amendment insisted thatthe sundown proviso was necessary in order to coerce the Justice Department to set up the computing machine cheque system quickly. The Gekas # 8217 ; amendment prevailed on a 236-98 ballot. McCollum proposed an amendment which would revoke the bing State waitingperiods on the installment of the national blink of an eye cheque system. Some States had alreadyadopted waiting periods, and the Brady bill would not affect those states having a waiting periodof more than five days. McCollum claimed that his proposal would make the bill much fairerand more balanced, and assured that it would not affect other State gun laws such as Virginia’sone gun purchase per month legislation. However, meeting with strong opposition fromSchumer and others, this amendment preempting State laws was rejected 175-257. There wasanother amendment proposed by Jim Ramstad (R-MN) requiring the police to provide within 20days a reason for any denial of a handgun purchase. This amendment was accepted bySchumer, and was adopted easily by the vote of 431-2. The House proceeded to voted on the Brady bill on Nov. 10. Just before the vote, thechief sponsor Schumer encouraged other Representatives on the floor to vote for the bill, saying:†today’s votes gives the House of Representatives a real chance to stem the violence on our streets and calm the fear of our citizens.† The bill was passed by the House. It was the secondtime for the House to pass the Brady bill, and this time, the vote was 238-189. Passage in the SenateIn the Senate, the Brady bill was introduced as S 414 by Metzenbaum on February 24,1993, referred to the Judiciary Committee and placed on the calendar on March 3. The bill wasalmost identical to the Dole-Metzenbaum-Mitchell compromise approved by the Senate in June1991, requiring a five-day waiting period on handgun purchases which was to be removed oncean instant check system became operational. After a long negotiation, the Senate agreed to takeup the bill separately from the overall crime bill,9 which paved the way for the floor considerationof the bill on November 19. However, the threat of the unsatisfied GOP opponents to block the bill led to anagreement between the Majority Leader Mitchell and the Minority Leader Dole. Under thisagreement, the two leaders was to offer a substi tute, and the Senate would then vote on theHouse-passed version of the Brady bill (HR 1025) with the text of the substitute inserted in lieuthereof. The Mitchell-Dole substitute included two new provisions: the sunset provision and thepreemption provision, both of which had been sought by the NRA. The sunset provision wasidentical to the Gekas amendment passed by the House which would end the waiting period fiveyears, and the preemption provision was the same as the McCollum amendment rejected by theHouse. At the beginning of the debate on November 19, Mitchell made it clear that he hadagreed to cosponsor this bipartisan compromise as a procedural means to move the long-debated Brady bill through the Senate. The Majority Leader then declared that he would nowmove on to eliminate those two provisions with which he totally disagreed. The Mitchell-Doleagreement provided, however, that if either or both of those provisions were to be stricken, theRepublican opponents would then block th e bill, which meant that the Brady proponents wouldneed at least 60 votes to stop the GOP filibuster to pass the bill and send it to the House.Mitchell and his other Democratic proponents succeeded to pass an amendment striking thepreemption language of the Mitchell-Dole substitute on a vote of 54-45. The other amendmentproposed by Metzenbaum to strike the sunset provision, however, was defeated 43 -56. TheSenate then moved on to the consideration of the Mitchell-Dole substitute with one provisionthus amended. Throughout the debate, the proponents spoke fervently in support of the bill. EdwardM. Kennedy (D-MA) argued that it was time to take action against the epidemic of gun violencein the country, showing shocking statistics which demonstrated the increasing number of gun-related crimes and deaths. He claimed that the waiting period would not only curb the spread ofguns by keeping the lethal weapons out of the hands of convicted felons, but it would alsoreduce the crimes committed in the heat of the moment by providing a cooling off period. Senators whose States had already adopted waiting periods demonstrated with data that thewaiting period had already been proven to work in stopping a significant number of handgunpurchases by convicted felons. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) showed that her State’s 15-daywaiting period stopped 8,060 convicted felons, 1859 drug users, 827 people with mentalillnesses as well as 720 minors from purchasing a gun during January 1991 and September1993. The freshman Senator from California maintained that even though her State’s crime ratewas â€Å"unacceptably† high, it could have been much worse without the legislation. Dole and other GOP opponents, however, insisted that they would continue their effortsto thwart the passage of the bill unless the preemption language was included. Mitchell promptlyrejected the GOP demand, criticizing the double principles of those who, having once insistedthat they could not supp ort the Brady bill because it was the Federal Government telling theStates what to do, turned around and said that they now liked the preemption. Metzenbaumjoined in the argument against the GOP opponents, saying they were blocking the bill â€Å"becausethey were scared to death of the National Rifle Association,† and calling their demand for thepreemption provision â€Å"an effort to kill the bill.† Both sides did not yield, and with two cloturemotions having failed to quash the Republican-led filibuster, one in the afternoon (57-42) and theother at 11 o’clock at night (57-41), the Brady bill was thought by many dead again in theSenate. It was the dissatisfaction of a handful of Republicans with the outcome and their dread ofbeing blamed for killing this popular legislation that saved the life of the Brady bill. The followingday, the discontent of those Republicans who decided to cast a straight vote sent Dole to thenegotiating table again, where he was forced to settle down with a new compromise whichcarried no preemption language. It was actually identical to the one that he and other GOPopponents had filibustered the day before except for the change in the sunsetting period; thecompromise bill would end the waiting period four years after its enforcement, instead of fiveyears, with a possible extension for another year upon the Attorney General’s request. Consequently, by unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to vote on the House-passedversion of the Brady bill (HR 1025) with the text of the compromise inserted in lieu thereof, andalso to request a conference with the House to reconcile the differing versions of the Brady bill.The Brady bill (HR 1025) as amended was passed easily on a vote of 64 to 36, and sent backto the House with a request for a conference. Toward the passageOn November 22, the House agreed to the request of the Senate for a conference uponthe adoption of House Resolution 322 by the vote of 238-187. The confer ees were appointedby the Chairs of each chambers: Brooks, Hughes, Schumer, Sensenbrenner, and Gekas fromthe House and Joseph R. Biden. Jr. (D-DE), Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT),and Larry E. Craig (R-ID) from the Senate. Later, Senate Republicans replaced Hatch andCraig with Stevens and Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID). The outcome was a conference report whichpreserved the House 5-year sunset of the waiting period with no provisions for the AttorneyGeneral to replace it with the instant check system before then. Several Senate-passedprovisions had also been dropped: the provision expanding the definition of antique firearmsexempt from gun restrictions to include thousands of functioning World War era rifles, and theone allowing gun sales between dealers from different states. A new provision was added in thereport which would require that the police be notified of multiple purchases.Soon after the conference, the chief Senate negotiator Biden explained how they got tothe conferen ce report. According to his statement, at the beginning of the conference, Stevens,a member of the NRA board of directors, announced that the only acceptable outcome for theSenate Republican conferees, Kempthone and himself, would be the Senate-passed version ofthe Brady bill unchanged. The Senate bill had a provision ending the waiting period as early astwo years after the enforcement if the instant background check met certain standards. All ofthe House conferees including the House Republican conferees rejected that demand, which ledto the adoption of the conference report accepted by all the House conferees, Republicans andDemocrats alike, and the Senate Democratic conferees. Thus, the conference report was madewith Stevens and Kempthorne casting dissenting votes.The House approved the conference report (H. Rept. 103-412) easily on a vote of238-187. In the Senate, however, after the explanation on the conference report, Dole andother Republican opponents fired at Biden with accu sations that he and other DemocraticSenate conferees completely ignored the wishes of the Senate in the conference. Dole said, â€Å"Idon’t think that under these conditions, cloture will be invoked this year or next year.†10 Throughout the day November 23, the hostile atmosphere occupied the Senate floor asthe debate continued. Majority Leader Mitchell declared that he was determined to force theissue to another vote during the year even though it would mean the post-Thanksgiving sessionwhich nobody wanted. Later in the day, he presented two cloture motions for November 30and December 1.The breakdown of the impasse came the following day, November 24, when Doleagreed to accept the terms of the conference report under a compromise that he would submit aseparate bill with the Senate-passed provisions, which was to be considered and votedimmediately in January as soon as the Senate returned to business. Obviously, this solution wasprompted by the loathing of most senator s to come back from their respective States toWashington after Thanksgiving break as well as by the pro-Brady public pressure.Consequently, the Senate approved the conference report by unanimous consent. After seven years of debate, the Brady bill was finally passed by the 103rd Congress.President Clinton, as he had promised, signed the bill into law on November 30, and the Bradybill became Public Law 103-159. Beyond the passageThree years have passed since the passage of the Brady bill, but the fight of Jim andSarah Brady and other gun control advocates still continues for stricter gun control legislation. Inearly 1994, they succeeded in passing the assault weapons ban with the Brady momentum, butsince then the NRA has intensified its lobbying, declaring to repeal the gun control legislation. In1994 elections, for example, the NRA spent $3.2 million to get its supporters elected.11 The last1996 election was also a victory for the NRA in that many of its supporters got re-elected ev enthough their member Dole was defeated by Clinton in the Presidential race. Their most powerfulsupporter in the Congress is probably the House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), who oncewrote in his letter to the NRA chief lobbyist Tanya Metaksa: â€Å"As long as I am Speaker of thisHouse, no gun control legislation is going to move in committee or on the floor of this House.†12Even with the GOP majority in Congress, however, it is sure that NRA supporters will face amajor obstacle in the newly-reelected President Clinton, who has declared: â€Å"For all the thingsthat will be debated, you can mark my words, the Brady law and the assault weapons bill arehere to stay. They will not be repealed.13? Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing a lawsuit filed by NRA-backed gun controlopponents. They claim that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violates the 10thAmendment of the Constitution which protects state and local government from certain federalinterference. The NRA says i t wants to repeal the waiting period as well as the backgroundchecks,14 which reveals the organization’s true intention when it supported the backgroundchecks in its fight against the passage of the Brady bill. The battle between the NRA and theHandgun Control Inc. will continue with the NRA supporters leading the Congress andPresident Clinton challenging them with the veto power. Nevertheless, the Brady bill, with itsunwavering public support, will be the hardest bill to repeal. The passage of the Brady bill of 1993 is one of the best case studies of the legislativeprocess in the U.S. Congress. The seven year history of the bill demonstrated how partisanpolitics played a crucial role in the outcome of the bill, and how difficult it was to make bipartisancompromises to move the bill through Congress. In concluding this research report, I would like to express my deepest respect for thosewho worked hard for the passage of the Brady bill, including Jim and Sarah Brady.